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Developing Lines

Forgiveness and Literature
by Michael Fischer

I

magine a community where constructive dialogue across political,
class, and other differences is rare. Threatened by disagreement,
individuals cluster together with like-minded believers, often egging one
another on into taking even more extreme positions, usually against
their ideological opponents. Sources of information are selected to
ratify existing views instead of challenging them. Shielded from external
perspectives, individuals stay stuck in anger, opposition, and resentment,
recycling grievances against their enemies and spinning out fantasies
of revenge.
Fresh insight into this not-so-hypothetical scenario comes from an
unlikely source: recent studies of forgiveness, starting with Sarah Beckwith’s excellent Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness. Resentment
and the longing for revenge are definitively studied in Shakespeare’s
tragedies. Beckwith shows that the anguish in these tragedies runs even
more deeply than feeling wronged, wanting to get even, and doubting
that justice will be done unless one takes matters into one’s own hands.
Hamlet, for example, feels not just outraged by his father’s murder but
abandoned, trapped inside himself and radically on his own, unable
to have his grief and sense of injustice heard by his mother, who joins
her new husband in thinking Hamlet has mourned enough. When she
asks Hamlet why grief “seems . . . so particular with thee,” her lack of
sympathy triggers Hamlet’s angry response that he knows not “seems,”
that he has “that within which passes show” (1.2.75–76, 85). Drawing

Philosophy and Literature, © 2013, 36: 504–512

Michael Fischer

505

on the work of Stanley Cavell and J. L. Austen, Beckwith argues that
such thoroughgoing loss of confidence in making oneself intelligible
to others impoverishes the inner life it might seem at first to protect.
Despairing of being heard, we end up feeling we have nothing to say,
nothing, at any rate, that will matter.
Feeling betrayed by his mother thus pushes Hamlet to the conclusion
that his words and actions cannot reach others. But this conclusion
exerts its own pull on him because it exempts him from what Beckwith
calls “the terrible responsibility of having to account for yourself.”1 If
incomprehension is a foregone conclusion, then there is no need to
try making oneself clear to others and no obligation to find the right
words. The pressure to explain oneself can feel “terrible” because of
“the relentless exposure to others [it] entails” (p. 19): others who can
ask more or less helpful questions, misunderstand, and be influenced
for better or for worse by what you tell them. As Beckwith shows, Shakespeare’s tragic heroes in different ways flee this exposure and seek some
measure of control over the give-and-take of human relationships—at
great cost to themselves and others. Othello is the clearest case of a man
trying to wrench reality into his private fantasy, specifically his conviction that Desdemona is unfaithful and deserves death, which overrides
anything she might do or say.
Forgiveness enters Beckwith’s account as a possibility that these
tragic heroes resist granting or seeking. They balk at seeking forgiveness because it puts them at the mercy of unpredictable, independent
others. These heroes find it difficult to grant forgiveness for much the
same reason. Offering forgiveness exposes these tragic figures to the possibility of change, in this case the change that can result from creating
new relationships no longer structured around the roles of avenger and
wrongdoer. Beckwith cites Hannah Arendt’s view that forgiveness frees
us from “the predicament of irreversibility”: “without being forgiven,
released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to
act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we
would never recover” (p. 2). Forgiveness, in other words, breaks the
hold of the past and allows a different future to emerge for both parties.
Shakespeare’s tragedies show how the open-endedness of that future,
its dependency on uncertain ongoing interactions with others, can be
experienced as a terrifying loss of autonomy and control.
Beckwith focuses on how four late Shakespeare plays—Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and The Tempest—embrace forgiveness while
acknowledging the ongoing lure of resentment and revenge. She deftly
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explores the cultural underpinnings of these plays, in particular the
Reformation reframing of confession and forgiveness as an individual’s
relation to God unmediated by the intervention of priests or by participation in a public sacrament. Protestant skepticism about the efficacy of
rituals and religious authorities put individuals on their own, accountable
to one another as well as to their personal sense of God. Shakespeare’s
late plays explore individuals newly exposed and answerable to one
another. These “post-tragic” (p. 4) characters refashion relationships
and communities by accepting the reciprocity with others that earlier
tragic heroes avoid.
These characters are “post-tragic,” not because they bypass the bitterness and disappointment that define tragedy but because they work their
way through them. Pericles’s grief at the loss of his wife and daughter,
for example, locks him into silence and isolation. He stifles his words
because he cannot imagine any listener grasping his pain. His despair of
being heard recalls Hamlet’s, but Pericles goes on to recover his voice
in his reunion with his daughter Marina. More exactly, he and Marina
recover their voices together, in conversation with one another, each
one acknowledging the grief of the other. Like any relationship, this one
will remain vulnerable to misunderstanding, mutual recrimination, and
suspicion, but the reunion of Pericles and Marina shows how these darker
possibilities can be counteracted, if not vanquished once and for all.
More generally, Beckwith demonstrates how Shakespeare’s theater
enacts “a search for community, a community neither given nor possessed
but in constant formation and deformation” (p. 5). Forging “paths to
forgiveness” (p. 4) is essential to that search because forgiveness turns
our finally unavoidable interdependence into mutual growth. “The restoration of each person to him or herself” ends up being “inseparable
from, intimate with” (p. 105) the restoration of broken personal and
social relationships facilitated by forgiveness.
As someone who values the distinctive contributions of philosophy
and literature, I am gratified by how this account of forgiveness in
Shakespeare’s plays dovetails with Charles Griswold’s Forgiveness: A
Philosophical Exploration, a remarkably thorough and insightful analysis
of the subject. Although Beckwith does not cite Griswold, had she done
so she would have found reinforcement for her key claims about forgiveness in Shakespeare, in particular the emphasis on the reciprocity
that characterizes forgiveness and the transformational possibilities that
forgiveness can unleash.
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Griswold’s account centers on interpersonal forgiveness, which for
him grows out of a dialogue between a wrongdoer and his victim. The
offender can initiate this dialogue by meeting several conditions: by taking responsibility for his damaging actions or words; by regretting the
harm he has done; by seeing his wrongdoing from the point of view of
the victim and the larger community and accepting their condemnation;
by apologizing, asking for forgiveness, and vowing to learn from his misdeeds and not repeat them. These conditions are not discrete items on
a checklist but interrelated steps that the offender must take. Crucially,
the offender must express to the victim his remorse, his acknowledgment of the victim’s suffering, and his commitment to change. The
obligation to communicate with the victim underscores the offender’s
respect for the victim as someone owed an honest explanation, and
puts the offender at the mercy of the victim’s unconstrained response.
By asking for forgiveness, the offender is seeking to rejoin the larger
moral community and acknowledging his need for the victim’s consent.
Forgiveness, in short, emerges from an exchange with the person who
has been wronged, not from a dialogue of the mind with itself. Introspection is necessary but not sufficient for forgiveness to occur.
The victim, in turn, must relinquish any desire for revenge, commit
to overcoming resentment, and trust the offender’s self-representation,
including his expression of contrition and stated willingness to change.
None of this is easy. Griswold is especially good at plumbing the appeal
of resentment or the simmering anger that can set in even after the
administration of punishment. It can be difficult to let go of resentment,
our sense of being wronged, especially when we may have come to define
ourselves in opposition to the person who has hurt us. “In opposition
to” usually means “as better than”: giving up resentment can entail surrendering our reassuring feeling of moral superiority or, what comes
to the same thing, admitting our kinship with an enemy we may have
demonized. Sometimes an offense can be so horrible that the victim
cannot forgive the perpetrator even when he has taken every step to be
forgiven. Other times, however, an unforgiving victim can be faulted for
being vindictive, hard-hearted, or stubborn. Nevertheless, even though
forgiveness can be recommended, it cannot be coerced without violating the victim’s autonomy all over again. There is never any guarantee
that an apology will be forthcoming or accepted, and there will always
be cases when “the threshold of what will count as forgiveness is not
crossed; sadly and painfully, in such cases we are either unforgiven, or
unable to forgive.”2
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But when one individual asks for forgiveness and another individual
extends it, both are voluntarily engaged in a transaction that enables
each of them to move on instead of staying stuck in what Griswold calls,
also citing Arendt, the “predicament of irreversibility” (p. 100): “forgiveness does not reiterate the past but instead promises renewal without
forgetfulness, excuse, or condonation of past wrongs” (p. 211).Both the
offender and his victim are able to acknowledge—and remember—what
happened between them without being forever defined by it. Repaired,
their relationship is now free to take many forms, from agreeing to stay
out of one another’s way to friendship and even love.
Although interpersonal forgiveness is central to Griswold’s study,
he also considers several closely related topics, among them political
apology (the University of Alabama, for example, recently apologizing
for its historical implication in slavery). Political apology is especially
interesting because it crystallizes what in Griswold’s view we can hope
from social life. At best, a successful political apology can enable both
parties to gain trust in one another, resume or begin collaborating,
and thereby begin working together to create a community aware of
the acrimonious conflicts of the past but determined to outgrow them.
This determination requires constant nurturing and renewal (Griswold is
rightly skeptical of facile talk of achieving “closure”). We remain fallible
beings in an imperfect world where injustice persists and where we will
continue to face opportunities for disappointment, anger, and disgust.
But if political apology and forgiveness are not panaceas, neither are
they a waste of time. They make possible moments of reconciliation,
hope, and peace that may not “satisfy the soul’s deepest yearnings” (p.
193) but that still allow us to rise above the “ongoing violent conflict
and ferocious retaliation” (p. 193) that would be our lot without them.
As we have seen, Shakespeare’s late plays also celebrate these moments
of reconciliation, even as a tragic hero like Othello adds to the “violent
conflict and ferocious retaliation” that forgiveness can suspend. Forgiveness for Griswold underscores our vulnerability to one another, which
Othello, again, finds unbearable. Othello would rather destroy Desdemona than allow her to expose him to change (to paraphrase Cavell).
But if the possibility of dialogue and empathy is fragile, it is still resilient
enough to keep forgiveness alive. Although Othello’s violent resistance is
a force always to be reckoned with, it doesn’t have the final say in either
Griswold’s account of forgiveness or Beckwith’s reading of Shakespeare.
Griswold and Beckwith converge on another key point. Both see literature as playing a crucial role in enabling forgiveness. For Griswold,
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forgiveness is bound up with the creation, exchange, and interpretation
of stories. The offender faces the test of telling his victim a story that
makes sense of his past wrongdoing and its impact on the victim, a story
that acknowledges his deeds as his, while urging that he has changed. In
deciding to forgive, the victim must not only accept that story but also
continue his own story in a direction no longer dictated by having been
wronged, though always remembering it. In the narrative exchanges
that constitute forgiveness, the possibilities for self-deception and confusion, as well as mutual enlightenment and growth, are endless and, in
Griswold’s view, “best left to literary description” (p. 106). In any given
case, “much will hinge on just what words are chosen, why contrition
was expressed at all, and so forth. Moral philosophy cannot provide
guidance at that level of detail, and literature is much better suited to
describing the particulars and their context” (p. 121), the context again
being the complex interpersonal dynamics that make up forgiveness.
Along similar lines, Beckwith finds “therapeutic and diagnostic power”
(p. 9) in Shakespeare’s theater. She points out that Hamlet’s pessimism
about “outward” behavior expressing “inner” thoughts is “deeply antitheatrical”: “in dislocating the natural relation between words, gestures,
and appearances, and ‘that within,’ the fundamental resources of theater
are voided” (p. 33). Shakespeare “lends his art to restoring the mind
and soul to the face, and the process evolves theatrical forms in which
reconciliation and forgiveness become central” (p. 33). Theater does
not simply reenact the pursuit of forgiveness, but furthers it.
An equally powerful role is assigned to literature in Jill Scott’s A
Poetics of Forgiveness: Cultural Responses to Loss and Wrongdoing. Scott’s
central contention is that literature and the other arts can facilitate
forgiveness and resolve conflict. She arrives at this claim via Jacques
Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and Kelly Oliver. Unlike Griswold, Derrida,
according to Scott, argues that forgiveness must be radically unconditional and “aneconomical,” an irrational, “mad” gift with no strings
attached or return expected. In its purest form, forgiveness thus defined
is for Derrida impossible. We cannot in everyday life extricate ourselves
from practical considerations, political concerns, and other interests.
Responding to Derrida, Kristeva reaffirms the irrationality and radical disinterestedness of forgiveness, but for her the gift of forgiveness
comes from aesthetic activity. If forgiveness for Derrida cannot be implemented, for Kristeva it is always available in the unconsciously produced
ambiguities of poetic discourse as well as in the bottomless creativity of
literary interpretation. Aesthetic production, whether in literature or
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criticism, unsettles rigid dualisms (for example, between offenders and
victims) that try to fix meaning. As Scott puts it, “the infinite possibilities of creative communication” affirmed by Kristeva allow us “to start
afresh and to begin anew.”3 Finally, Oliver makes personal growth itself
dependent on the “ethics of continual self-questioning” (p. 13) that
fuels forgiveness. Strengthening the tie between creativity and forgiveness, Oliver, Scott concludes, “takes forgiveness to a whole new level by
transforming it from an instrumental means of overcoming a singular
instance of conflict or wrongdoing into an ethical stance and a mode
of being in the world with others” (p. 12). Forgiveness becomes “a kind
of attitude or disposition, a way of being in the world” (p. 11) fostered
by aesthetic activity.
I am attracted to Scott’s conclusion that literature and the other arts
encourage a way of coexisting with others akin to forgiveness or at least
conducive to it, say by promoting openness to change and willingness to
reframe what seems inalterable. But the theoretical support Scott gives
the link between literature and forgiveness seems shaky to me. She tends
to repeat the ideas of Derrida, et al., instead of further developing or
clarifying them. She supports these ideas not by arguing for them but
by caricaturing the more performative approach taken by Griswold and
others. She notes, for example, that forgiveness “must be much more
than a speech act, pronouncing: ‘I forgive you.’ In the most positive
sense, forgiveness must start with the self, must be a practice of tolerance,
understanding, and mutual healing, or even a mentality that pre-exists
any wrongdoing” (p. 53). I cannot think of anyone who disagrees with
this, not even the most ardent advocate of speech act theory.
The theoretical ideas invoked by Scott recur in her book without
advancing our progress through it, like speed bumps in a road. Fortunately, the readings that these ideas punctuate rise above their tenuous
theoretical support and make a better case for the role literature can
play in inspiring forgiveness. Scott thoughtfully discusses in a wide range
of sources, from the Iliad and Kafka’s Letter to His Father to Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill I and II; photography by Robert Fleming (of postwar
Germany) and Kresta K. C. Venning (from postgenocide Rwanda); and
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Her treatment
of several post-9/11 novels is especially insightful. Scott wrote her book
in part because after September 11 she sensed that “resolution and
reconciliation was quickly giving way to vengeance, at least in American
foreign policy” (p. ix) and that grief was being “strategically leveraged
to create a public discourse of justified revenge” (p. 168). She shows
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how literature and the other arts can intervene in that discourse in
constructive ways, making A Poetics of Forgiveness a timely, humane book.
The essays collected in The Ethics of Forgiveness return us to the view
of forgiveness as a complex bilateral process as opposed to a pure gift.
The book was occasioned by a conference on Griswold’s work, and the
contributors refine some of his key points, contest others, and address
topics he leaves undeveloped, among them self-forgiveness, cultural
influences on forgiveness, and the limits of forgiveness. Although the
volume as a whole exemplifies the care and attentiveness that makes
Griswold’s analysis so illuminating, two essays stand out.
In “Conditional Unconditional Forgiveness,” Eve Garrard and David
McNaughton revisit the legitimacy of unconditional forgiveness and
conclude that in all circumstances, even when the offender remains
recalcitrant, “there is sufficient reason to forgive.”4 They emphasize that
forgiveness is still “a heavy and difficult task” (p. 105) rather than an
easy surge of fellow feeling. Even unconditional forgiveness must meet
certain demanding internal conditions, which Garrard and McNaughton
go on to explore. Although there can always be a reason to forgive a
wrongdoer no matter how unrepentant he may be, there is still “such
a thing as objectionably facile forgiveness” (p. 97), or instances when
forgiveness comes too easily—a point that can be overlooked when
forgiveness is compared to an irrational gift.
In “The Self Rewritten: The Case for Self-Forgiveness,” Garry Hagberg
elaborates on how the literary imagination can inform self-forgiveness as
well as enable forgiveness between individuals. Having hurt someone, we
sometimes judge ourselves in the name of the person we have injured,
someone we may continue to think about even after he has forgiven us.
We can be too hard on ourselves in this judgment but we can also be
too easy, for example, by minimizing the impact of what we have done.
Hagberg carefully shows how calibrating the consequences of our actions
or words on another requires “a kind of literary imagination, thinking
our way with genuine imaginative sympathy into the experience of the
injured” (p. 73), thereby internalizing the “warranted resentment”
(p. 73) he feels. Seeing ourselves from the vantage point of another
is essential to our acknowledging what we have done. Self-forgiveness
is set in motion when we are able to resituate our misdeeds, releasing
other possibilities in ourselves that we can then commit to realizing. We
create the “person we want to be” (p. 79) in much the same imaginative way as we take responsibility for what we did. Aspiring to a better
self, like regretting what we have done, takes imagination. As Hagberg
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persuasively demonstrates, creating a better future while still recalling
the past turns out to be “deeply akin to our engagement with literary
texts” (p. 78).
I mentioned earlier how Scott began writing A Poetics of Forgiveness
in the wake of September 11, as she searched for an alternative to the
reigning discourse of retaliation and revenge. In her acknowledgments,
she observes that “much has changed in the world” (p. ix) since September 11. Anger has given way to “new optimism and faith in humanity
with the election of the first black president of the United States, who
has made clear his commitment to change of massive proportions”
(p. x). She adds that Obama “will have a hard time living up to the
expectations of his electorate” (p. x). Her prediction has come true, as
for many people optimism has yielded to frustration with the political
stalemate I described at the outset: polarized groups nurturing their
grievances (real and imagined) against one another and looking for
chances to get ahead or get even. The books I have been discussing
not only sketch an admittedly difficult path beyond mutual recrimination, they show the crucial role that literature can play in making that
path possible: a major achievement at any time—but especially now,
when political discouragement is exceeded only by widespread public
skepticism about the value of literature and the other arts. Thanks to
studies like these, beleaguered defenders of literature may yet be in a
position to make Emerson’s words their own: “Patience and patience,
we shall win at the last.”
Trinity University
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